Volume 29
Issue 1 Wilderness: Past, Present, and Future
Winter 1989

Just Compensation for a Taking - Fractional Interests Escheated
from Tribal Members to the Tribe, Hodel v. Irving
Manuel Lucero

Recommended Citation
Manuel Lucero, Just Compensation for a Taking - Fractional Interests Escheated from Tribal Members to
the Tribe, Hodel v. Irving, 29 Nat. Resources J. 279 (1989).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol29/iss1/17

This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository.
For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

NOTE
JUST COMPENSATION FOR A TAKINGFRACTIONAL INTERESTS ESCHEATED FROM TRIBAL
MEMBERS TO THE TRIBE, HODEL v. IRVING,
-U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2079 (1987).
FACTS
In Hodel v. Irving,' the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Eighth Circuit, finding unconstitutional section 207 of the Indian Land
Consolidation Act of 1983.2 Section 207' had provided that certain lands
would revert from individual Indians to Indian tribal ownership in order
to consolidate ownership of these lands in the Indian tribe. Several affected
individual Indians asserted the government had taken their land unconstitutionally because no compensation was paid to them. The Court agreed,
holding the section 207 land consolidation to be in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.
The section 207 issue was taken into court by Mary Irving, Eileen
Bisonette, and Patrick Pumpkin Seed, individuals denied their inheritances of forty-one fractional land interests. The government seized these
lands in 1983 in order to consolidate them according to section 207. The
plaintiffs, members of the Sioux Indian tribe, filed suit in the Federal
District Court in South Dakota in 1983."
The district court held plaintiffs had no claim to the property at issue
prior to the death of their relatives. The court reasoned that the Federal
government's right to control apportionment of all Indian lands must
include authority to change rules of Indian land inheritance. 5 Since Congress had power over Indian affairs, section 207 of the 1983 Act was
constitutional.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 6 focusing not on Congress' authority over Indians, but instead on the fundamental nature of
the right to inherit. The circuit court found that surviving family members
1. 107 S.Ct. 2076 (1987).
2. Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2515 (portions codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§2201-2210 (1988 Supp.)).
3. "No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent (sic] by intestacy or devise
but shall escheat to the tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in
such tract and has earned to its owner less than $100 in the preceding year before it is due to
escheat." Id. at 2519.
4. Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1985).
5. See Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U.S. 288, 294 (1918).
6. Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1985).
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had a right to control the land of the deceased, regardless of conflicting
federal polices. A taking of that right, without just compensation to the
estate, violated the Fifth Amendment.
In the Supreme Court, South Dakota made two arguments. The First
was de minimis injury; South Dakota argued that appellees had not suffered sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III of the Constitution. ' Second, the state argued that
plaintiffs had not asserted their own legal rights and interests, but those
of their deceased relatives and thus the Indian Land Consolidation Act
of 1983 did not constitute a "taking" of appellees' decedents' property
without just compensation. The Supreme Court was squarely faced with
the question of whether this regulation of Indian property deprived the
Indian devisees of constitutional individual rights.
BACKGROUND
With the Supreme Court's absolute pronouncement before us--Indians,
like anyone else, enjoy constitutional property rights-it is difficult to
see what could have been the issue. How could Congress have thought
it could take some people's land and give it to an organization? We could
not imagine the government confiscating the land of Episcopalians to
consolidate in an Episcopal Park controlled by Episcopalians for all Episcopalians. But the federal government's relationship to Indian lands, both
privately and communally held, is of a kind different from its relation to
any other lands of American citizens.
The roots of the problem Congress was attempting to correct in section
207 are both ideological and statutory. The statutory root involves a grand
scheme to replace communal Indian land holdings with yeoman plots in
the late 1800s. The General Allotment Act of 1887 was the blueprint for
this scheme.'
The General Allotment Act reflected on the federal level a shift in
nineteenth century views of Indian identity. Instead of viewing Indians
as members of a tribe, Congress wanted to view Indians as individuals
capable of assimilation into American society. Under this theory, reservations were no longer needed as safe havens for a beleaguered people.
Instead, the reservations were seen as barriers to Indian advancement and
assimilation. Once the Indians were civilized and assimilated, so the
theory ran, they would need less land, and the surplus would be available
for non-Indian settlers. 9
7. While a good theory has been cited by plaintiffs, in this case they have not suffered enough
damage monetarily ($1800 by one of the plaintiffs) in order for their case to be heard in this forum.
8. Ch. 119, 24 Star. 388.
9. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 125 (1982).
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The General Allotment Act authorized the President to divide Indian
reservation lands 0 among the members of the tribe in specified quantities
for agricultural and grazing purposes." Lands so provided to individual
Indians were to be held in trust for 25 years and then would be conveyed
in fee to the individual Indian land holders.' 2 Indians to whom land was

allotted were made subject to state laws and became U.S. citizens.' 3

Although the intent of the General Allotment Act was to make farmers
out of the American Indians on their allotted land, it soon became clear
that the goal was not being achieved. The new Indian land owners began
to lease or sell their newly acquired assets. Often, they either sold land
outright or were defrauded by white traders or land companies. ' This
problem was already apparent when Congress turned its attention to the

Great Sioux Reservation.
The Sioux Nation presented a challenge. It was so large that the Act's
distribution plan could not work. The Great Sioux Nation was comprised
of three main groups, the Teton, the Brules, and the Oglala Sioux. Their
land stretched from North Dakota to Nebraska, and from the western
border of South Dakota to the Mississippi River,"5 a total of 21,593,128
acres. In order to subject Sioux lands to an allotment scheme, Congress
had to break this huge reservation into smaller pieces. Congress first acted
to divide the Great Sioux Reservation into six smaller reservations by

passing the Sioux Act of 1889.6
The Sioux Act of 1889 not only broke the Nation into pieces, but it
also cut away considerable acreage, "restoring" over eight million acres
to the public domain.'" The United States was to act as trustee for the
10. Reservations were created for the Indians by either Treaty or Executive order.
1I. The act was basically implemented as an umbrella act under which other acts were passed.
As a statement of overriding congressional intent, it resembled in form the environmental acts of
the next century, for example see the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131-36.
12. The General Allotment Act distribution plan was to be implemented as follows: heads of
households took 160 acres, each single person over eighteen took 80 acres, and orphan children
under eighteen took 80 acres. Ch. 119, § I, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
13. Id. §§6,24; see also Sioux Act of 1889, ch. 405, §8, 25 Stat. 888 (1889).
14. Some of the larger land swindles resulted in national scandals and congressional investigations.
See, e.g., Comm. on Indian Aff. Rept., H.R. Doc No. 1035, 27th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1842); see
also F. COHEN, supra note 9, at 130.
15. The boundaries were 46 degrees north to 43 degrees north latitude and from 104 degrees west
to 92 degrees west longitude. The Nation occupied more than half of what is today the state of
South Dakota. In the Secretary of the Interior's view the Great Sioux Reservation stood in the way
of the advancement and progress of civilization and commerce. Land was needed for agriculture
and grazing. Yet its occupants would not use the land and continued to block the national process
of the people. W. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, at 389 (1973) citing Report of the Secretary of the Interior.
16. Ch. 405, 25 Stat. 888. The size of the Sioux Nation's Land consisting of 6 reservations was
reduced from 21,593,128 acres, to 12,845,521 acres, a loss of 8,747,600 acres. I W. WASHBURN,
THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, at 405 (1973).
17. Id.
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Indians Tribes' 8 disposing of this "excess" land to settlers under provisions of the Homestead Act.' 9 Congress then attacked the remaining Indian
holdings, reservation by reservation.
The reservation act at issue in Hodel v. Irving was passed in 1889,
within months of the first Sioux Act. Congress had two years experience
with allotments and knew of the problem of Indian lands being sold to
non-Indians immediately after allotment. To prevent this alienation of
Indian ownership,2' the Sioux Act provided that the allotted land was to
be held in trust by the United States. 2' No Sioux Indian could sell his
land.
The implementation of the allotment policy created problems, both
short and long term. In the short term, the General Allotment Act created
more yeoman landlords than yeoman farmers, and in the long term it
fractionalized large, usable holdings, creating a patchwork of unmanageable parcels. Rather than farm the land, many Indian land owners
entered into rental agreements with white farmers and ranchers.22 As time
passed and the heirs of the land owners came into possession of the
allotted lands, additional problems began to emerge. Based on inheritance
through several generations, parcels of lands now had dozens of owners.
Though the land was held in trust by the government, 23 as the land became
more fractionalized the administration of the interest became unworkable
and economically wasteful. 24 By the 1930s the government was faced
with mountains of records arising out of the allotment process. Because
of this administrative nightmare, productive land went unused amidst
great poverty.
In 1934, Congress suspended any further allotments of Indian land.25
But the problem of fractional interests in lands already allotted continued
to grow. By 1960, congressional studies showed that one-half of the
approximately 12 million acres of allotted lands were held in fractionated
ownership, with over 3 million acres held by more than six heirs to a
parcel .26
18. The General Allotment Act as well as the Sioux Act provided that the government would be
the trustee of the Indians for a period of 25 years. There was a proviso that the President could
extend this period for not more than 10 years. General Allotment Act, ch. 119. §5, 24 Stat. 388,
(1887); see also Sioux Act of 1889, ch. 405, § 11, 25 Stat. 888, (1889).
19. Id.
20. See supra note 14
21. Ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388; see also ch. 405, § 1I, 25 Stat. 888.
22. Lawson, Heirship: The Indian Amoeba, reprinted in Hearing on S. 2480 and S. 2663 Before
the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83 (1984) (statement of
Richard W. McAdams).
23. Ch. 119, §5. 24 Stat. 388; see also ch. 405, § I1, 25 Stat. 888.
24. L. Meriam, The Problem of Indian Administration, INST. FOR GovT. REs. 40-41 (1928).
25. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, (current version at 25 U.S.C.
§461, (1982)).
26. See Indian Heirship Land Study, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1960); Indian Heirship Land Survey, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1960).

Winter 19891

HODEL v. IRVING

In order to reverse the process of fractionalization of Indian lands, in
1983 Congress passed the Indian Land Consolidation Act.27 The Act
provided that when a parcel of land "represent[ed] 2 per centum or less
of the total acreage in such tract and ha[d] earned to its owner less than
$100 in the preceding year" it would revert to the tribe. 2
If this scheme were applied to private property of non-Indians it would
constitute a taking of land for which just compensation is required under
the Fifth Amendment. Yet, Congress had not addressed the subject of
compensation for the taking of these lands in section 207 of the Indian
Land Consolidation Act.29
ANALYSIS
The Justices Respond
In Irving v. Hodel, all nine Justices of the Supreme court found that
the escheat provision of section 207 was invalid because it denied plaintiffs
a basic property right, the right to pass on property by descent or devise.
In a decision with four concurring opinions, the Court affirmed the Eighth
Circuit's finding of a Fifth Amendment violation. Section 207 was held
to be an impermissible means of accomplishing the result Congress sought
to achieve.
The Court's analysis is based on rights, not land values.' The Court
envisioned regulations like section 207 destroying "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property, the right to exclude others."
In Kaiser Aetna v. United States,3 as in Irving, a regulation affected
a basic property right, the right to exclude the public from private property.32 In Kaiser, the owner of a pond merged his pond with a state
controlled bay creating a marina, which the Ninth Circuit concluded was
subject to the "navigational servitude" of the federal government and
thus the public had a right of access to the plaintiffs private property. The
United States Supreme Court in Kaiser held, in order for private property
to obtain public access status, the United States had to invoke its eminent
domain powers and pay just compensation. 33
Writing for the Court in Irving, Justice O'Connor commented that
common sense may dictate an end to fractional interests, 34 but that more
was at stake. O'Connor deplored taking away a fight that had been
27,
28.
29.
30,
31.
32.
33.
34.

Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2515 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §2206 (1982 ed., Supp. III)).
Id. at 25 U.S.C. 2207.
id.
Irving, 107 S. Ct. at 2082.
444 U.S. 164 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 178-80.
Irving, 107 S. Ct. at 2083.
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recognized since feudal times in the Anglo-American Legal system. In
this case, plaintiffs' ability to pass on property by devise was completely
abolished. A substitute is available that could limit or elude the escheat
provision in question, she reasoned, but a complex system of inter vivos
transactions such as revokable trusts is not adequate. The nature of the
rights of property must remain whole.35 Thus, the Court found that this
regulation, in the words of Justice Holmes, "goes too far." 36
While the Supreme Court was unanimous in finding rights more compelling than issues of regulation, no less than four opinions were filed.
Justice Brennen, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall and
Justice Blackmun, added that what the act does is to downgrade the
property from one in fee to one of a life estate, a diminution which the
Supreme Court has suggested in dicta would constitute a taking without
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 37 Furthermore, disposition of property at death has always been an important stick in the
bundle of rights property owners have in their land. The power to control
disposition predominantly characterizes the "white mans ways," 38 which
the Indians were to copy. The intent of Congress early on was to assimilate
the American Indians into the mainstream of society as citizens.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White concurred.They reasoned that,
the elimination of fractional interests was a valid government purpose
but was nonetheless unconstitutionally achieved in this instance. Section
207"9 could only have been held constitutional if it had authorized the
government to act in one of three ways; 1) to purchase the fractional
interests outright; 2) to condemn the interests for a public purpose and
pay just compensation; or 3) to leave the interest untouched while fostering
consolidation by gift or voluntary conveyances within a reasonable period
of time.4 The statute could be valid, therefore, only if the third option,
gift or voluntary conveyance, were implemented, since Congress did not
authorize the first two options.'
The legislative history bears out the Stevens/White analysis. It appears
that Congress added section 207 to achieve an end without thinking of
the consequences of no compensation for the escheatable lands. The
provision was clearly an afterthought, as Congress first identified its goal
in the Indian Land Consolidation Act and then searched for a means to
35. See id.
36. Id. at 2084 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
37. id., at 2084.
38. Id. at 2088 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979)).
39. Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub, L. No. 97-459. 96 Stat. 2519 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §2206 (1982 ed., Supp. II1)).
40. Irving, 107 . Ct. at 2085.
41. Id.
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reach that goal. The original draft of the Indian Land Consolidation Act
directed tribes to compensate individual owners for any fractional interests
acquired and no mention of escheat existed.4" Section 207 was later added,
lacking the requirement of just compensation. Thus, while Tribes are
required to compensate for land under other provisions of the Act, this
requirement does not apply to section 207.
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), when publishing the new rule
under section 207 two months later, circulated a memo which aided the
Indian land owners in defeating section 207. It outlined three ways by
which the owner of a fractional interest of less than two percent of a tract
could enlarge that interest to more than two percent.43
Justices Stevens and White further argued that value of land is not the
determining factor for measuring the scope of the dual constitutional
guarantees that there be no taking of property without just compensation
and no deprivation of property without the due process of law. ' They
stated that the Fifth Amendment draws no distinction between grand
larceny and petty larceny.45 In their view, section 207 deprives decedents
of due process of law in that it does not allow owners time to consolidate
fractional interest in order to avoid the escheat provisions of the statute.'
Indians as Land Owners
The allotment process in effect created separate, yet connected ways
of looking at Indian property rights. The allotment process purposefully
deprived Indians of their right to sell their lands. Originally the tribe Held
equitable title to tribal land while the United States, as the trustee for the
Tribes, held the legal title. Once the land was privatized and apportioned
to individual tribal members, the United States retained legal title, while
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2086, 2087, The memorandum stated:
To assure the effectiveness of a will or heirship succession under state law, any Indian
owner within the above category (if he or she is concerned that the tribe rather than
his or her heirs or devisees will take these interests) may purchase additional interests
from coowners pursuant to 25 C.FR. § 151.7 and thereby increase his/her ownership
interest to more than two percent. Another alternative is for such an owner to convey
his/her interest to coowners or relatives pursuant to 25 CF.R. § 152.25 and reserve a
life estate, thus retaining the benefits of the interest while assuring its continued
individual, rather than tribal, ownership. A third alternative, if feasible, is to partition
the tract in such a way as to enlarge the owner's interest in a portion of said tract.
Indians falling within the above category and who are presently occupying, or in any
other way using, the tract in question should especially be advised of the aforementioned
alternatives.
44. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 540-41 (1982)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
45. Id. at 2089.
46. Id. at 2091.
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the individual members held the equitable title. 47 Unless an individual's
right is recognized federally or by tribal law, the tribal member has only
future and imperfect rights.48 If a property right is recognized in the
individual member, the question remains, can the land owner pass to his
heirs the land he owns? Or is there a restriction on his property right
because of the special status between Native Americans and the federal
government? Irving v. Hodel demonstrates an unwillingness by the Supreme Court to allow the federal government to eliminate the aspect of
devisability as applied to fractional interests affected by section 207 of
the 1983 Indian Land Consolidation Act.
The Government as Trustee and Legislature
In order to stop the enormous problem of allotment fractional interests,
the Secretary of Interior implemented the Indian Land Consolidation Act
of 1983, 49 section 207 of which would escheat unproductive land back
to the tribe.5" A problem arose, however, in implementation of the Act.
The Secretary's role in implementing the Act conflicted with his duty, as
the third party representing the decedent, 5' to vigorously pursue the decedent's claim.52 Under Federal law the Secretary is required to represent
the best interests of Indians. Therefore the Secretary must represent the
interests of the individuals deprived of inheritance. On the other hand,
the Secretary also has a duty to the tribe and to Congress to prevent
creation of any further fractional interests.53
The Secretary's dilemma is borne out in Irving. On the one hand, the
Secretary had to prevent further fractionalization of Indian allotted lands
while still acting in a responsible manner in pursuing the claims of the
heirs of deceased tribal members. In this case, the heirs were opposed
to the reversion of land they claimed as theirs. It would appear that by
taking the land, in fact, the government eliminated the right to will away
real property. The Supreme Court addressed this argument but based its
conclusion on non-Indian standards and not on the unique status of the
American Indian.

47. F. COHEN supra note 9, at 605-09.
48. Id.
49. Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2515 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2206 (1982 ed., Supp. i1)).
50. Fractional interests that represented two per centum of the initial allotment and produced
$100 or less the previous year would revert to the tribe.
51. At common law a third party was the one to pursue the surviving claims of a decedent. The
unique status of the American Indian, with the Federal government as the trustee, places the Secretary
of the Interior in this third party position. 25 U.S.C. §§371-380 (1982).
52. Id.
53. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
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Allotment Plus Fractional Interest Equal Failure
By the turn of the century the Federal government began to recognize
and admit that its grand experiment was failing. The federal policy goal
to individualize and assimilate the Indian into the American mainstream54
had failed in implementation. A new policy developed in the late 1920's
and 1930's. The policy encouraged a revival of tribalism and the preservation of the Indian heritage.5"
In 1924, the Secretary of Interior ordered a non-governmental report
on the state of the American Indian. The Meriam Report,56 published in
1928, shocked the government. The report described poverty, disease,
suffering and discontent that overshadowed the lives of the majority of
American Indians.57 In 1928 Congress commissioned a second Indian
report, this one on the problems with the fractional interests created by
the General Allotment Act.5" The report condemned the Allotment Act,
and found that fractionalized interests were administratively unworkable
and economically wasteful."
Amicus curiae briefs filed in the Irving case describe examples of the
problem today; ten original allotments now have anywhere from 247 to
464 heirs each, one-third of whom received $.05 in annual rental, and
two-thirds less than $1.00. 0 The common denominator used to compute
fractional interests in the property was 3,394,923,840,000.61 The smallest
rental share using these figures would be $.01 every 177 years. 62 If the
tract could be sold63 for its estimated average value of $8000, the owner
of the smallest share would be entitled, again using these figures, to
$.000418.' The administrative costs of handling this tract were estimated
by the BIA at $17,560 annually.65
Economically and administratively, allotment is unworkable. Arguments by persons living with the allotment scheme are that the government
created the problem, and it should live by it or correct it without injuring
the interest of its Indian wards. Yet there is a split among the Indian tribes
54. W. HoxIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS 1880-1920 (1984).
Allotments were one way in which tribal existence was terminated, F. COHEN, supra note 9, at 130.
55. F. COHEN, supra note 9, at 146.
56. See supra note 24.
57. F. COHEN, supra note 9, at 144.
58. 107 S. Ct. at 2079 (1987).
59. Id.
60. SeeAmicus Curiae Brief of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe for appellant, Hodel v. Irving,
107 S.Ct. 2076; see also Irving, 107 S. Ct. at 2081.
61. Irving, 107 S.Ct. at 2081.
62. id.
63. This assumes all 247 to 464 owners could agree.
64. Irving, 107 S. Ct. at 2081.
65. Id.; see also Comment, Too Little Land, Too Many Heirs-The Indian HeirshipLand Problem,
46 WASH. L. REv. 709, 711-13 (1971).
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themselves as to what should be done. The Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux'
argue that section 20767 should be held valid." 8 They claim, as did the
government, that the land, while held in fractional interests, is worthless
to anyone. The land is unworkable and is a hindrance rather than an
asset.69 If the fractionalization is not stopped, the argument goes, it will
further diminish the ability of tribal members to use their land and become
self-determining. The only benefactors of tribal land would be the nonIndian.7' Therefore they argue that the government has an obligation to
pursue the goals of the escheat provision, to reconsolidate Indian communal holdings." The end result may be that the individual may not get
use of the land, but the tribe definitely would. 72
The argument against section 207 is based on fundamental constitutional principles. A taking is a taking, and just compensation should be
paid in accordance with the Fifth Amendment.73 Even though the land is
small in area, the interest still exists and must be protected. The Fifth
Amendment does not protect property itself, but protects the owner's
personal interest in it.'
The Court's decision in Irving was consistent with the reasoning in the
amicus curiae brief written by Pacific Legal Foundation:
There is no question that the relative economic impact of section
207 upon the owners of these property rights can be substantial....
While the Irving estate lost two interests whose value together was
only approximately $100, the Bureau of Indian Affairs placed total
values of approximately $2,700 and $1,816 on the escheatable interest 75in the Cross and Pumpkin Seed estates. These are not trivial
sums.
It can be seen that the arguments made by the amicus curiae, as well
as the points addressed by the Supreme Court, are not Indian law arguments. The arguments go toward the elimination of a property right by
the government. The Court and the amici submitted briefs in support of
66. The Mar. 2, 1889 Act did not apply to them since the tribe never agreed to the allotments
and was never compensated for lands taken.
67. Pub. L. No. 97-459, §207, 96 Stat. 2515, 2519 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §2206 (1982 ed.,
Supp. 111)).
68. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, supra note 60, at 3, 5.
69. Supra note 60, at 3.
70. Supra note 60, at 5.
71. One example of how to do this is to make the land a gift inter vivos. Thus the land would
never come under the statute.
72. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, supra note 60 at 5.
73. Brief Amicus curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Appellee, Hodel v. Irving,
107 S.Ct. 2076 (1987). See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
74. Amicus CuriaeBrief of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe, supra note 60, at 7.
75. Irving, 107 S.Ct. 2076, 2082 (1987).
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the property rights remaining strong are afraid that if this case were
decided any other way it would tend to unravel the bundle of rights
property owners have historically and constitutionally enjoyed. In this
instance, once property reached a certain size, the ability to devise it
disappeared. Had the court been concerned with the Indian law aspects
of this case, it would have had to face or distinguish the fact that Indians
only hold equitable title to land. Taken further, the Indian land owner
can no longer exercise one of the most important property rights in the
mythical bundle, that of being able to sell his land. Unlike non-Indians,
Indians must obtain permission from the United States, the Indians' trustee,
before the sale of land is even contemplated. If this deprivation of property
rights were applied to non-Indians, the American people would be up in
arms. The Court side-stepped the entire issue by looking at individual
non-Indian property rights, in the guise of Indian law.
The Court looked at the right of a property owner to devise his property
at death. It saw this deprivation as going too far. If the Court had faced
the unique situation of an Indian's inability to sell his land, it may have
decide differently. If such analysis had been done and the result had
remained the same, the Court would have, in effect, prioritized property
rights. In this instance, the ability to alienate property would not have
been as important as the ability to devise it.
CONCLUSION
The problem remains. On the one hand, the fractionalized interests tax
the coffers of the federal government as well as its administrative staff.
On the other hand, to escheat the lands back to the tribe takes away a
critical property right. The United States Supreme Court is rights sensitive, as can be seen by looking at the opinions in Irving, as well as in
the Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,76 and Nollan v.
CaliforniaCostal Comm'n" decisions. The Court seems to be saying that
76. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). After a New York statute was passed allowing the installation of cable
television in apartment buildings, a landlord sued, contending that a taking had in fact occurred and
that she was entitled, therefore, to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court agreed, holding that the minor but permanent physical occupation of the owner's
property authorized by the state law constituted a "taking of property for which just compensation
is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution." When the character of the
governmental action is a permanent physical occupation of real property, there is a taking to the
extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit
or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.
77. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). As a condition to the issuance of a rebuilding permit, owners had
to provide lateral access (an easement) to the public to pass and repass across their property .to public
beaches. The United States Supreme Court held the Commission could not condition rebuilding
permits to provide an easement across private property without the state paying just compensation
for the easement it was creating.
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it is the job of Congress to correct the current problem. The Irving decision
has only invalidated one avenue that Congress thought it could take.
Congress, it seems, saw only one result of section 207: that the land in
question would go back to the tribe for the benefit of all tribal members.
It failed to consider that Indians are property owners and thus should be
compensated for their lost land.
Justice Stevens pointed to solutions that Congress could have, but failed
to take. Some avenues that Congress or the Tribes could pursue are: 1)
let the tribe know of the escheatable property and allow them to buy the
interest, 2) have the government pay the owner for the land and allow
the tribe to maintain the newly acquired asset, thus making the statute
valid, or 3) incorporate the fractional interest owners so that the land can
be unified and made productive, with each shareholder receiving a portion
of the rental from either a non-Indian or tribal lease. The possibilities are
not infinite, but the solution should take into account the interests of the
individual land owners and the tribe. The landowners make up the tribe,
and thus a workable plan would benefit both.
MANUEL LUCERO

